There should not have to be as much opposition, considering the fact thatthere was a clear violation of the UN Security Council resolution and thatBush was not the only one to point out the imminent threat of Iraq’s WMD,as Clinton had already done it some time ago. Many reasons caused the negative of the Security resolution, the differentexcuses given by the US government, the build-up of military forces aroundthe Persian Gulf, the negative from the US to extend the deadline to the UNteam in Iraq headed by Hans Blix and many others caused the members of theworld community and most important, the members of the UN Security Councilto say NO. In the year 2002, the US had made a huge advance related to this matter inthe Security Council, when they approved the resolution 1441 that commandedIraq to destroy many of their long-range missiles and let the UN inspectorsto enter Iraq to verify the probability of the creation of WMD. Many of themost important issues were left out of the discussions, such as thequestion if the USA would need a second resolution to invade Iraq or the1441 would suffice? , This was never thought out carefully by the USdiplomacy and it would turn out to be a very costly mistake. Bush had many reasons besides the threats of WMD to invade Iraq, such asthe elimination of a murderous dictatorial regime that could be the hostfor illegal groups and would probably have close links with Osama binLaden, to make Saddam to take UN resolutions seriously as an example forthe rest of the world and to bolster democracy in the middle east.
But Bushhad not given another example of bolstering democracy elsewhere, why didn’tthey bolster democracy in Saudi Arabia, being such a friendly country. The members of the Permanent Security Council and of the transitory councilrepresented the opinions of the world, and they saw a US eager to go to warwith or without resolution. The troops were lining up the Arabian Sea, weeks after the decision in theUN. The only thing that the members of the S.
C. wanted was an extension of 4 to9 months in the deadline, so that the UN weapons inspectors would have timeto present proper information to back-up the decision of the S. C. The world certainly didn’t need the mockery of Rumsfeld and the flaws ofDick Chenney, pressuring the countries to take the “proper” resolution andblackmailing them with those famous phrases that even today we gladlyremember such as: “YOU ARE EITHER WITH US OR AGAINST US”, certainly it wasnot very well taken by the members of the S.
C. Finally, when the USA decided to take the procedures to get the secondresolution approved by the UN, as a personal petition of Tony Blair, theysaw it crash it down when Paris, Berlin and Moscow joined together in theidea that with the inspectors Iraq was not in the position of making new oreven using old WMD. The European countries regard international law as of vital importance intheir every day existence, but as they knew it very well, Bush was not afan of these international treaties, as he showed it with the annulment ofthe Kyoto Protocol, the Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty, the ComprehensiveTest Ban treaty, the Biological weapons convention, the internationalcriminal court waiver to US soldier and finally the declaration of Rumsfeldof not using the Geneva treaty for the captured soldiers in Guantanamobase. The worrying thing was that the members of the R. S.
C. didn’t event get avisit from Collin Powell to try to sell them their agenda, and as a resultthey didn’t even get the approval from Turkey at the start of the war tohave a front of attack from the north, something that was assured by the USdiplomats. Even Jose Maria Aznar, a stalwart ally of USA said in some occasion: ” WENEED A LOT MORE OF POWELL AND A LOT LESS OF RUMSFELD”. Wheter it was incompetence or ideology, Washington inconsistency on theirjustifications for war, the non-synchronizing of diplomacy and force, thenon-proactive action of the possible partial compliance of Iraq with theUN, the impossibility to muster international support for the secondresolution and to sell the US reasons to war to the international diplomacyconstituted the defeat of the US foreign policy.
A war with greater legitimacy would have put Iraq on the spotlight and notthe United States. Now the USA have to really worry that so many countrieshoped the Iraq would have been a better contender, that they would have putmuch more resistance, that they would have killed more US soldiers andeventually drag them out of the conflict and ask themselves, what wouldhappen the next time the USA would want to do the same with another countrythat is “threatening” US security? Will it have more adepts to Rumsfeldmockery policy, or Chenney blackmailing strategies? Or will the USA learnedthe diplomatic importance and will it learn to appreciate the internationalsupport and realize that we live in a symbiosis and that they are not theonly country in this world and learned to live in a joined community. This essay has impacted and will continue to impact the lives of millionsof people around the world, because through this essay we can see whatwould the consequences be if a nation neglect to pay attention to thediplomatic field, when dealing with other nations. It also shows how wouldand how will the opinion and relations of the world would deter when anation sees themselves as omnipotent and not obligated to subordinatethemselves to a common international law and see it as below them and a wayhow to stop future preemptive attacks to destroy those countries that onemight think is endangering the security of one’s country.
What would happenwhen China, India, Pakistan or North Korea would take exactly the samedecision as the US did with their “enemies”? Will it be the start of theend?———————–Marcel GrossMarcel GrossMarcel Gross1245